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If most people desire to maximize feelings of self-worth, how do we
explain the persistence of low self-esteem? Results from four stud-
ies suggest that people with low self-esteem may be less likely to
accept positive feedback from themselves than from an outside
source but equally likely to accept negative feedback from the self
and an outsider. When the self was the source of positive feed-
back, people high, but not low, in self-esteem incorporated the
feedback into their self-views; in contrast, when positive feedback
came from a knowledgeable external source, both high and low
self-esteem people accepted it. Finally, when self-generated feed-
back was negative, participants low in self-esteem accepted it.
The authors discuss how these findings shed light on the mainte-
nance of low self-esteem.
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Once established, self-esteem tends to remain stable
across time (Baumeister, 1993). Research has shed light
on many of the mechanisms that promote maintenance
of high self-esteem (e.g., Steele, 1988; Taylor & Brown,
1988; Tesser, 1988) but much remains to be learned
about the mechanisms that promote stability of low self-
esteem.
Our goal in this article is to explore the idea that low
self-esteem may maintain itself, in part, by making the
individual immune to the beneficial effects of certain
forms of esteem-enhancing feedback. Specifically, we
propose that people with low self-esteem are less able or
willing to accept positive feedback from themselves than
from an outsider. Although others have speculated
about the possibility that low self-esteem persons do not
accept positive feedback from themselves (e.g., Blaine &
Crocker, 1993), this phenomenon has not yet been
tested empirically. We therefore present a series of stud-
ies in which we explore the implications for self-esteem
maintenance represented by self-generated feedback
(feedback issued by the individual) versus externally
generated feedback (feedback from an outsider). We
believe that this investigation allows insight into what
Baumeister (1993) has termed “the puzzle of low self-
regard” (p. 201).
LOW SELF-ESTEEM AND POSITIVE
SELF-GENERATED FEEDBACK
Several theoretical perspectives can be invoked to
explain why a person with low self-esteem might fail to
acknowledge and/or accept positive self-generated feed-
back. For example, Baumeister, Tice, and Hutton’s
(1989) self-presentational model is based on the assump-
tion that low self-esteem persons adopt a cautious and
self-protective interpersonal style so as to avoid humilia-
tion and/or loss of face. By assiduously avoiding a pos-
ture that might cause others to see them as proud or
boastful, people with low self-esteem forestall the shame
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that would result if their performance or abilities fell
short of their claims. However, their self-protective ori-
entation may render low self-esteem people relatively
immune to their own internal feelings of success because
were they to trust their positive self-generated feedback,
they might appear boastful. On the other hand,
Baumeister et al.’s model allows for the possibility that
low-self-esteem people will accept positive feedback
from an outsider because claiming success based on
externally generated feedback does not appear as boast-
ful—and is therefore not as risky—as claiming success
based on self-assessment of one’s performance.
From another perspective, people with low self-
esteem may be relatively inattentive to self-generated
feedback in general because they are preoccupied
instead with others’ evaluations of them. According to
Leary’s (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, &
Downs, 1995) sociometer theory, feelings of low self-
esteem arise when the individual perceives that she is
about to be rejected or excluded by others. Because
inclusion in social groups is important for survival (e.g.,
Bowlby, 1969), people who chronically fear exclusion,
that is, low self-esteem persons, should be particularly
sensitive to other people’s evaluations of them.
Although hypervigilant to feedback that connotes accep-
tance or rejection by others, people with low self-esteem
may be less attuned to their own feelings of success or
failure because these feelings are not directly tied to
their inclusionary status.
A third possibility is that people with low self-esteem
simply do not see themselves as credible sources of posi-
tive feedback and are therefore reluctant to accept such
feedback. Research on persuasion has established that
people are less influenced by information from a low—
as compared to a high—credibility source (e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, when the source of self-relevant
information (feedback) is viewed as inaccurate or
untrustworthy, people may refuse to accept the feed-
back. On the other hand, when the source of feedback is
regarded as knowledgeable and trustworthy, people may
accept the feedback as veridical and adjust their self-
views accordingly. Given that low self-esteem persons
have relatively negative and unconfident self-views (e.g.,
Campbell, 1990), it follows that they may perceive them-
selves as noncredible sources of positive feedback (cf.
Brockner, 1988, p. 29). In contrast, low self-esteem per-
sons may view an “expert,” such as a knowledgeable
experimenter, as a highly credible source of positive
feedback. This idea is consistent with Blaine and
Crocker’s (1993) proposal that “people who are low in
self-esteem have trouble believing their intrapsychic
attempts at self-enhancement. Hence, they rely on elicit-
ing positive reactions from others to enhance the self”
(p. 80; see also Baumgardner, Kaufman, & Levy, 1989).
Regardless of why people low in self-esteem hesitate to
accept positive self-generated feedback, we propose here
that their tendency to ignore subjective, self-generated
feelings of success may play an important role in the
maintenance of their low self-esteem. In the absence of
feedback from an external agent, when people with low
self-esteem perform well on a task, they may remain
unaffected by this positive self-generated feedback. Con-
versely, people with high self-esteem should accept posi-
tive feedback from both a credible outsider and the self.
Unlike their low self-esteem counterparts, people with
high self-esteem focus attention on their positive quali-
ties (Baumeister et al., 1989), do not characteristically
fear rejection from others (Leary et al., 1995), and hold
highly favorable self-views (e.g., Brown, 1991); thus, high
self-esteem persons should embrace positive feedback
and incorporate it into their self-views, regardless of its
source.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We conducted four studies to test the assumption that
people with low self-esteem are reluctant to accept posi-
tive feedback from the self. In Study 1, we looked to see
whether people with low versus high self-esteem differ in
their willingness to accept positive self- and experimenter-
generated feedback about their performance on a novel,
competence-relevant task (a series of anagrams). We
used the same anagram series in Study 2 to examine
whether the state self-esteem of people low versus high in
trait self-esteem was differentially affected by positive
self- and experimenter-generated feedback. In Study 3,
we explored the possibility that people low in self-esteem
would accept self-generated feedback on an anagram
task if it matched the general valence of their self-views
(i.e., if it was negative). Finally, we utilized a self-report
methodology in Study 4 to test the hypothesis that peo-
ple with low versus high self-esteem differ in the extent to
which they trust and accept self-generated positive feed-
back in both social and competence-relevant domains.
Taken together, the purpose of these studies was to dem-
onstrate the ironic fact that the very people who are
often most in need of a self-esteem boost—those chroni-
cally low in self-esteem—may find it particularly difficult
to assimilate positive self-generated feedback into their
self-views.
PILOT STUDY
In Studies 1 through 3, we operationalized self-
generated feedback as a noticeable change in perfor-
mance across a series of anagrams. Past research suggests
that anagrams may be ideal for the administration of self-
generated feedback because participants typically have
little or no prior experience with anagrams (Shrauger &
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Sorman, 1977) and it is fairly easy to manipulate partici-
pants’ subjective assessments of performance by chang-
ing the order in which a series of anagrams is adminis-
tered (Josephs, Silvera, & Giesler, 1996). To establish
that our anagram manipulation produced the intended
self-generated feedback effects, we conducted a pilot
study. We sought to show that when anagrams are
ordered from most to least difficult (or from least to
most difficult), participants correctly perceive changes
in the difficulty of the anagrams as well as changes in
their speed at solving the anagrams. An additional pur-
pose of the pilot study was to explore self-esteem differ-
ences in reactions to the neutral, experimenter-generated
feedback that we planned to use in the ensuing studies.
We recruited 20 introductory psychology students
who scored in the bottom 25th percentile and 19 who
scored in the top 25th percentile (Ms = 3.16 and 5.41,
respectively) on Tafarodi and Swann’s (1995) Self-Liking
and Self-Competence Scale (SLCS). The SLCS consists
of 20 statements pertaining to people’s feelings of self-
worth and competence; responses were made on scales
of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and were inter-
nally consistent (α = .93).
Participants began by completing a booklet contain-
ing a series of 12 five-letter anagrams. We manipulated the
order of the anagrams to produce three self-generated
feedback conditions: descending difficulty (anagrams
were ordered from most to least difficult), ascending dif-
ficulty (anagrams were ordered from least to most diffi-
cult), and constant difficulty (anagram order was ran-
domized). Diff iculty of the anagrams was
operationalized as normative solution time and was
established in earlier research conducted by the first
author.
Following the anagram task, the experimenter took
participants’ anagram booklets to “look them over”; in
the meantime, participants used scales anchored by 1
(strongly disagree) and 9 (strongly agree) to rate their agree-
ment with six statements about the anagram series and
their own solution times. Two of these items (“The ana-
grams got easier as I proceeded through the series” and
“I found that I was able to solve the anagrams more and
more quickly as I went along”) were correlated at r = .70,
p < .001, so we combined them into a single measure of
perceived descending difficulty of the anagrams. Two
more items (“The anagrams got more difficult as I pro-
ceeded through the series” and “I found that I became
slower and slower at solving the anagrams as I went
along”) were correlated at r = .77, p < .001, so we com-
bined them into a single measure of perceived ascend-
ing difficulty of the anagrams. The remaining two items
(“The difficulty level of the anagrams stayed about the
same as I proceeded through the series” and “I found
that my speed at solving the anagrams did not change
much as I went along”) were correlated at r = .62, p < .001,
so we combined them into a single measure of perceived
constant difficulty of the anagrams.
After participants made these ratings, the experi-
menter returned and administered a dose of neutral
performance feedback; specifically, she told the partici-
pant that “you did about how I expected” on the ana-
grams. She then left participants with a final question-
naire on which they rated, using scales ranging from 1
(not at all) to 9 (very), how positive, negative, and neutral
the experimenter-generated feedback was (in addition
to several filler items).
We submitted participants’ perceptions of anagram
difficulty to a 2-between (self-esteem: low vs. high) × 3-
between (anagram difficulty order: descending vs.
ascending vs. constant) × 3-within (perceived change in
difficulty: descending vs. ascending vs. constant)
ANOVA (means and standard deviations appear in Table
1). A significant Anagram-Difficulty-Order × Perceived-
Change interaction emerged, F(4, 66) = 30.29, p < .001.
In the descending difficulty condition, participants
rated the anagrams higher in descending difficulty than
in either ascending or constant difficulty; in the ascend-
ing difficulty condition, participants rated the anagrams
higher in ascending difficulty than in either descending
or constant difficulty, and in the constant difficulty con-
dition, participants rated the anagrams higher in con-
stant difficulty than in either descending or ascending
difficulty. Across all conditions, participants perceived
more descending difficulty in the anagram series than
either ascending or constant difficulty, F(2, 66) = 4.25, p
< .05. Important for our purposes, however, there was no
main effect of self-esteem on perceived change; self-
esteem did not interact with perceived change, and the
three-way interaction was not significant, all Fs < 1.1
Next, a 2-between (self-esteem: low vs. high) × 3-
between (anagram difficulty order: descending vs.
ascending vs. constant) × 3-within (perceptions of feed-
back: positive vs. negative vs. neutral) ANOVA revealed
the expected main effect of perceptions of the experi-
menter-generated feedback (see Table 1). Overall, par-
ticipants rated the feedback as more neutral than either
positive or negative, F(2, 62) = 34.06, p < .001.2 Percep-
tions of the feedback did not interact with either ana-
gram difficulty order, F(4, 62) < 1, or self-esteem, F(2, 62)
= 1.25, p = .29, and the three-way interaction was not sig-
nificant, F(4, 62) = 1.17, p = .33.3
In summary, both low and high self-esteem partici-
pants perceived changes in their solution times, that is,
their performance, across the series of anagrams. The
anagrams therefore seemed like a reasonable method by
which we could administer performance feedback with-
out input from an outside agent. Moreover, there were
no self-esteem differences in perceptions of the neutral,
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experimenter-generated feedback, suggesting that this
feedback was appropriate for use in the subsequent
studies.
STUDY 1: DOES THE MESSENGER MATTER?
Our analysis suggests that people with low self-esteem
will incorporate positive feedback into their self-assessments
of performance on a novel, competence-relevant task
when the feedback comes from a credible outside source
but not when it comes from the self. In contrast, we
expect people with high self-esteem to accept positive
feedback about their abilities whether it comes from a
credible outside source or the self. To test these ideas, we
asked people low and high in self-esteem to solve a series
of anagrams that was rigged to provide either positive or
neutral self-generated feedback. An experimenter then
offered participants either positive or neutral feedback
about their performance. We predicted that among per-
sons with low self-esteem, reports of improvement would
be more affected by positive experimenter-generated
feedback than by positive self-generated feedback.
Among people with high self-esteem, we expected
reports of improvement to be affected by both the self-
generated and experimenter-generated feedback.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 153 introductory psychology stu-
dents who participated in exchange for course credit. At
the beginning of the semester, we administered the
SLCS during a mass pretesting session; only those stu-
dents who scored in the bottom and top 25% of the sam-
ple (Ms = 2.76 and 4.65 on a 5-point scale) were eligible
for participation. Data from 9 participants were
excluded from analyses due to failure to complete the
anagram series or suspicion regarding the true purpose
of the experiment; thus, the final sample consisted of
144 participants (56 men and 88 women).
PROCEDURE
In individual testing sessions, participants learned
that the purpose of the study was to test the relation
between anagram-solving ability and performance on
the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). The experimenter
emphasized that people who perform well on anagrams
also tend to perform well on the GRE, which is “consid-
ered an important indicator of overall intellectual func-
tioning.” Moreover, because participants’ performance
on the anagram series was likely to be poor at first due to
inexperience with the task, the experimenter noted that
improvement across the anagram series, rather than
overall performance, was the best indicator of ability.
Participants then began the anagram series, which
consisted of 15 five-letter anagrams presented individu-
ally on a computer (we used the 12 anagrams from the
pilot study plus 3 additional anagrams for which we had
normative solution time data). The easiest anagram in
the series had a mean solution time of 28 s and the most
difficult anagram had a mean solution time of 83 s.
Approximately half of the participants solved anagrams
that were ordered from most difficult to easiest (the posi-
tive self-generated feedback condition); for the remain-
ing participants, the same 15 anagrams were presented
in a random order (the neutral self-generated feedback
condition).4 Overall solution time across the anagram
series was measured for each participant.
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Perceived Improvement and Perceptions of the Neutral Feedback (Pilot Study)
Anagram Difficulty Order Condition
Descending Constant Ascending
Self-Esteem/Dependent Measure M SD M SD M SD
Low self-esteem/perceptions of
Descending difficulty 7.56 0.86 4.57 1.30 2.90 1.64
Constant difficulty 2.25 0.93 6.79 1.55 2.90 1.39
Ascending difficulty 1.31 0.37 4.57 1.69 7.00 1.58
Positivity of feedback 4.50 2.20 4.57 1.99 5.00 0.71
Neutrality of feedback 6.63 2.20 7.43 1.90 7.40 2.61
Negativity of feedback 3.88 2.59 4.71 1.70 3.80 1.79
High self-esteem/perceptions of
Descending difficulty 7.60 1.14 3.92 1.16 3.56 2.56
Constant difficulty 2.30 0.76 6.50 2.32 2.38 1.77
Ascending difficulty 2.30 1.15 3.33 0.75 6.25 2.90
Positivity of feedback 4.75 1.89 5.20 1.48 5.25 0.46
Neutrality of feedback 7.75 0.96 7.00 1.73 8.50 1.41
Negativity of feedback 1.25 0.50 4.00 1.41 4.88 1.25
NOTE: Scores can range from 1 to 9.
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After completing the anagram series, participants
received a questionnaire packet that contained several
filler questionnaires followed by a single item that served
as the dependent measure. Specifically, we asked, “Do
you think your performance got better or worse over the
series of anagrams?” Participants responded to this item
on a scale that ranged from 1 (it got much better) to 9 (it got
much worse). This item appeared toward the end of the
questionnaire packet so as to allow time for our manipu-
lation of experimenter-generated performance
feedback.
Two minutes after participants began working on
their questionnaire packets (but before they reached the
perceived improvement question), the experimenter
interrupted and explained that due to recent trouble
with the computer system, it was necessary to save the
participant’s anagram solution time data now so that it
would not be lost. The experimenter then entered some
commands into the computer to obtain a screen that
ostensibly displayed the participant’s anagram statistics.
After viewing the screen for approximately 10 s, the
experimenter delivered either positive feedback (“Looks
good. It seems like you did really well on a couple near
the end”) or neutral feedback (“This is about what I
expected”) to the participant. After receiving this feed-
back, participants finished their questionnaire packets
and were debriefed and thanked.
Results
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
To ensure that anagram solution times were not con-
founded with self-esteem level or feedback type, we sub-
mitted participants’ overall anagram solution times to a
2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) × 2 (self-generated feedback:
positive vs. neutral) × 2 (experimenter-generated feed-
back: positive vs. neutral) between-subjects ANOVA.
There were no significant main or interactive effects, all
Fs < 1.99, ps > .16. The overall mean solution time across
the anagram series was 20.85 min in the neutral self-
generated feedback condition and 24.18 min in the posi-
tive self-generated feedback condition.
SELF-RATED IMPROVEMENT
We expected that both low and high self-esteem par-
ticipants would report more improvement following
positive versus neutral feedback from an experimenter
but that only high self-esteem participants would report
more improvement following positive versus neutral self-
generated feedback. That is, we expected people with
low self-esteem to appear relatively unaffected by their
own feelings of improvement at this novel task. To exam-
ine predictions, we first reverse-scored responses to the
question, “Do you think your performance got better or
worse over the series of anagrams?” so that higher scores
reflected more improvement. We then submitted per-
ceptions of improvement to a 2 (self-esteem: low vs.
high) × 2 (self-generated feedback: positive vs. neutral) ×
2 (experimenter-generated feedback: positive vs. neu-
tral) between-subjects ANOVA and used the mean
square error term from the omnibus ANOVA in planned
contrasts to test our specific predictions.
The resulting pattern of means appears in Table 2.
Although the three-way interaction did not reach signifi-
cance, F(1, 136) = 1.37, p = .24, eta2 = .010, our predic-
tions were supported by a significant Self-Esteem × Self-
Generated Feedback interaction, F(1, 136) = 6.77, p <
.05, eta2 = .047.5 Planned contrasts confirmed that both
low and high self-esteem participants reported more
improvement if they received positive, as compared to
neutral, feedback from the experimenter, Fs > 36.00, ps <
.001, eta2 > .208. (This pattern also was demonstrated by
a significant main effect of experimenter-generated
feedback, F[1, 136] = 85.76, p < .001.) Moreover, whereas
low self-esteem participants reported similar improve-
ment following positive and neutral self-generated feed-
back, F(1, 136) = 1.16, p = .28, eta2 = .008, those with high
self-esteem reported more improvement following posi-
tive than neutral self-generated feedback, F(1, 136) =
23.29, p < .001, eta2 = .146. In addition, people low rela-
tive to high in self-esteem, and those who received neu-
tral relative to positive self-generated feedback, reported
significantly less improvement on the anagrams, Fs >
5.63, ps < .05, eta2 > .039. Finally, neither the Self-Esteem
× Experimenter-Generated Feedback interaction nor
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TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Perceived Improve-
ment (Study 1) and State Self-Esteem (Study 2)
Study 1: Experimenter-Generated Feedback
Neutral Positive
Self-Esteem/Self-Generated Feedback M SD M SD
Low self-esteem
Neutral 5.27 1.53 7.41 1.06
Positive 5.40 2.20 8.04 1.04
High self-esteem
Neutral 5.14 1.56 7.43 1.50
Positive 7.04 1.22 8.67 0.62
Study 2: Source of Positive Feedback
Self Experimenter
Self-Esteem M SD M SD
Low 49.35 7.18 54.11 6.90
High 65.38 7.35 67.56 4.57
NOTE: Perceived improvement scores can range from 1 to 9. State self-
esteem scores can range from 16 to 80.
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the Self-Generated × Experimenter-Generated Feed-
back interaction was significant, Fs < 1.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence of the
asymmetric effect of feedback source on self-reported
improvement. Following an anagram task, people with
low and high self-esteem who received positive feedback
from an experimenter reported improvement in their
performance, relative to those who received neutral
experimenter-generated feedback. On the other hand,
following positive self-generated feedback, only people
with high self-esteem reported improvement; those with
low self-esteem did not claim to have improved on the
anagrams despite the fact that they presumably noticed
decreases in their solution time per anagram across the
series. These findings thus support the idea that people
with low self-esteem are unlikely to accept positive feed-
back about their abilities on a novel task when it comes
from the self. A fuller examination of the asymmetric
effects of feedback, however, required that we investigate
the manner in which people’s self-views—and not
merely their performance assessments—were altered by
the receipt of self- versus experimenter-generated posi-
tive feedback.
STUDY 2: STATE SELF-ESTEEM EFFECTS
In Study 2, we examined whether low and high self-
esteem people’s feelings of state self-esteem were differ-
entially affected by the experience of receiving positive
self- versus experimenter-generated feedback. Our theo-
rizing suggested that people with low-trait self-esteem
should have higher state self-esteem following positive
experimenter-generated feedback than following posi-
tive self-generated feedback. In contrast, those with high-
trait self-esteem should experience similar levels of state
self-esteem following positive feedback regardless of its
source. To explore these predictions, we presented half
of our low and high self-esteem participants with a series
of anagrams that became progressively easier and then
offered them neutral feedback about their performance
(positive self-generated feedback condition). We pre-
sented the remaining participants with a series of ana-
grams that were randomly ordered and then offered
them praise about their performance on the anagrams
(positive experimenter-generated feedback condition).
Subsequently, participants rated their state self-esteem
and rated their performance on the anagrams.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
One-hundred introductory psychology students par-
ticipated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Only students who scored in the bottom or top 25% of
the distribution on the SLCS (Ms = 2.30 and 3.72 on a 4-
point scale) were eligible for the study. Data from 9 par-
ticipants were discarded due to suspicion regarding the
true purpose of the experiment. The final sample con-
sisted of 33 men and 58 women.
PROCEDURE
The procedure for Study 2 was similar to that for
Study 1, with two exceptions. First, we eliminated the
conditions in which participants received two doses of
congruent (both positive or both neutral) feedback. Thus,
participants who experienced positive self-generated
feedback received a neutral comment from the experi-
menter and those who experienced neutral self-
generated feedback received praise from the experi-
menter. The result was a 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) × 2
(source of positive feedback: self vs. experimenter)
design.
Second, after receiving the experimenter’s feedback
(but before rating their own improvement), participants
responded to 16 questions from Heatherton and Polivy’s
(1991) State Self-Esteem Scale (SSE). The SSE is a 20-
item scale that measures people’s current feelings about
themselves in social, performance, and appearance
domains (we excluded the four appearance items
because they were not relevant to our hypotheses). All
items were rated on scales of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely),
and respondents were instructed to answer with regard
to “how [you] are feeling at this moment.”
Results
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Replicating the results of Study 1, a 2 (trait self-
esteem: low vs. high) × 2 (source of positive feedback:
self vs. experimenter) between-subjects ANOVA on over-
all anagram solution times yielded no significant main or
interactive effects, all Fs(1, 87) < 1.80, ps > .18. In addi-
tion, in Study 2, we recorded participants’ solution times
for each anagram separately. Results of a 2-between (trait
self-esteem: low vs. high) × 2-between (source of positive
feedback: self vs. experimenter) × 2-within (anagram
block: first three vs. last three) ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant Source-of-Feedback × Anagram-Block interaction,
F(1, 87) = 53.28, p < .01. In the positive self-generated
feedback condition, mean solution time decreased from
33.37 s in the first block to 12.37 s in the last block, F(1, 46)
= 56.89, p < .01. In the positive experimenter-generated
feedback condition, mean solution time increased from
21.80 s in the first block to 31.86 s in the last block, F(1,
43) = 9.70, p < .05. Although this increase was statistically
significant, we do not view it as psychologically meaning-
ful, in part because it translates into a time-to-solution in-
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crease of less than 1 s per anagram. Finally, self-esteem did
not interact with source of positive feedback, F(1, 87) < 1.
PERCEIVED IMPROVEMENT
We next examined whether our previous finding
regarding self-assessments of improvement would repli-
cate. Results of a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant
Trait Self-Esteem × Feedback Source interaction on par-
ticipants’ self-perceptions of improvement, F(1, 87) =
4.76, p < .05, eta2 = .052, and planned contrasts con-
firmed our previous findings: People with low self-
esteem reported more improvement across the anagram
series when an experimenter gave them positive feed-
back than when it came from the self, Ms = 6.77 and 5.72,
F(1, 87) = 6.50, p < .05, eta2 = .070. In contrast, people
with high self-esteem reported equal improvement on
the anagrams regardless of whether source of positive
feedback was the self or an experimenter, Ms = 6.96 and
6.87, F(1, 87) < 1. Finally, people low in self-esteem
reported less improvement than those high in self-
esteem, F(1, 87) = 6.62, p < .05, eta2 = .071, and people
who received positive self-generated feedback reported
marginally less improvement than those who received
positive feedback from the experimenter, F(1, 87) = 3.30,
p = .073, eta2 = .037.
STATE SELF-ESTEEM
Did people’s perceptions of improvement across the
anagram series translate into changes in state self-esteem?
The Trait Self-Esteem × Feedback Source interaction did
not reach significance, F(1, 85) < 1, but planned con-
trasts confirmed our predictions.6 People with low-trait
self-esteem who received positive experimenter-generated
feedback reported higher state self-esteem than their
counterparts who received positive self-generated feed-
back, F(1, 85) = 4.61, p < .05, eta2 = .051; in contrast, peo-
ple with high-trait self-esteem reported similar levels of
state self-esteem in both feedback conditions, F(1, 85) =
1.49, p = .23, eta2 = .017 (see Table 2). Finally, there was a
main effect of trait self-esteem such that people low, rela-
tive to those high, in trait self-esteem scored lower in
state self-esteem, F(1, 85) = 107.23, p < .01, eta2 = .558,
and people who received positive self-generated feed-
back reported lower state self-esteem than those who
received positive experimenter-generated feedback,
F(1, 85) = 5.94, p < .05, eta2 = .065.
Discussion
Among people with high self-esteem, the source of
positive feedback did not moderate the feedback’s influ-
ence on perceived improvement across an anagram
series or feelings of state self-esteem. However, among
people with low self-esteem, perceived improvement on
the anagrams and state self-esteem were both higher fol-
lowing praise from an experimenter than following the
subjective experience of self-generated positive
feedback.
Taken together, the results of the pilot study and the
first two studies suggest that although people low and
high in self-esteem are equally likely to notice changes in
the speed with which they can solve anagrams, those low
in self-esteem are relatively unlikely to (a) interpret
these changes as reflecting improvement in their perfor-
mance and (b) rely on these changes to boost their tem-
porary feelings of self-worth. This supports our thesis
that low self-esteem is resistant to change, in part,
because of the reluctance of low self-esteem persons to
accept positive, self-enhancing feedback from them-
selves. To more fully explain the stubborn persistence of
low self-esteem, however, it is important to explore
whether low self-esteem people also resist self-generated
negative feedback.
STUDY 3: SELF AS A SOURCE OF NEGATIVE FEEDBACK
According to Swann and his colleagues (e.g., Swann,
1990; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & McNulty, 1992), people
low in self-esteem seek out and accept information and
feedback that verifies their negative self-views, even
though such behavior can have harmful consequences
for their affective states (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, &
Gaines, 1987). If those low in self-esteem categorically
reject positive self-generated feedback while embracing
negative self-generated feedback, we posit that the puz-
zle of low self-esteem can be moved one step closer to
solution.
To test this idea, we gave participants low in self-
esteem the opportunity to experience either negative or
neutral self-generated performance feedback and then
offered them either negative or neutral experimenter-
generated feedback and asked them to rate their
improvement across an anagram series. We expected
that people with low self-esteem would be willing to
incorporate negative self-generated feedback into their
self-assessments of performance because, although not
necessarily consistent with participants’ specific self-
views (indeed, participants presumably did not have pre-
established self-views regarding their anagram-solving
abilities), negative self-generated feedback, that is, a feel-
ing of failure at a novel task, would be consistent with the
low self-esteem person’s chronic tendency toward nega-
tive self-evaluation (e.g., Britt, Doherty, & Schlenker,
1997; Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001). Thus, we expected
that people with low self-esteem would report less
improvement across the anagram series when they
received negative versus neutral feedback, regardless of
whether the negative feedback came from the self or
from an experimenter.
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Method
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty-seven introductory psychology students partic-
ipated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Only students who scored in the bottom 25% of the dis-
tribution on the SLCS (M = 2.23 on a 4-point scale) were
eligible for participation. Data from six participants were
discarded due to suspicion or inability to complete the
tasks within the allotted time; this left a total of 29 men
and 52 women.
PROCEDURE
The procedure for Study 3 was identical to that for
Study 1, with a few exceptions. As in Study 1, partici-
pants solved a series of anagrams, received experimenter-
generated feedback about their performance, and rated
their improvement across the anagram series. In con-
trast with the procedure used in Study 1, participants in
Study 3 experienced either neutral or negative feedback.
For self-generated feedback, we presented some partici-
pants with the same randomly ordered anagram series
that was used in the previous two studies, whereas other
participants received an anagram series that grew pro-
gressively more difficult (we reversed the order of pre-
sentation of the progressively easier series that we used
in earlier studies). Participants in this condition thus
experienced a decline in performance across time, or
negative self-generated feedback. For experimenter-
generated feedback, some participants received the
same neutral feedback from the experimenter as in pre-
vious studies; the remaining participants received a neg-
ative experimenter comment (“Looks like you had some
trouble with a couple of anagrams near the end”). Thus,
we employed a 2 (self-generated feedback: negative vs.
neutral) × 2 (experimenter-generated feedback: nega-
tive vs. neutral) design.
Results
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
We performed a two-way ANOVA with self- and
experimenter-generated feedback as the independent
variables and total anagram solution times as the
dependent variable. Replicating our results from earlier
studies, this analysis confirmed that there were no main
or interactive effects of the independent variables on the
speed with which participants were able to complete the
anagram series, all Fs(1, 77) < 1.
PERCEIVED CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE
We expected that low self-esteem people would be
affected by both self- and experimenter-generated nega-
tive feedback; thus, a decline in performance over time
and a negative comment from the experimenter were
both expected to result in perceptions of declining per-
formance on the anagram series. To test our hypothesis,
we performed a 2 (self-generated feedback: negative vs.
neutral) × 2 (experimenter-generated feedback: nega-
tive vs. neutral) between-subjects ANOVA on ratings of
perceived improvement (means and standard deviations
for improvement ratings appear in Table 3). As expected,
the interaction of self- and experimenter-generated
feedback was not statistically significant, F(1, 77) < 1, but
both of the main effects were. Specifically, low self-
esteem participants who experienced negative self-gen-
erated feedback reported less improvement than those
who experienced neutral self-generated feedback, F(1,
77) = 58.45, p < .01, eta2 = .432, and participants who
received negative feedback from the experimenter
reported less improvement than those who received
neutral experimenter-generated feedback, F(1, 77) =
24.27, p < .01, eta2 = .240.
Discussion
People with low self-esteem who experienced either
self- or experimenter-generated negative feedback
reported less improvement across an anagram series
than those who experienced neutral feedback. Why did
participants in this study accept negative feedback from
themselves when they appeared reluctant to accept posi-
tive self-generated feedback in previous studies? Per-
haps, consistent with Baumeister et al.’s (1989) model, it
is relatively safe for low self-esteem persons to accept
negative feedback from themselves because doing so
does not put them at risk of appearing boastful. Alterna-
tively, low self-esteem persons may be particularly atten-
tive to negative feedback because it implies potential
exclusion (Leary et al., 1995) or they may consider the
self a credible source of negative feedback because they
are used to receiving such feedback from themselves.
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TABLE 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Perceived Improvement
(Study 3) and Willingness to Accept Feedback (Study 4)
Study 3: Experimenter-Generated Feedback
Neutral Negative
Self-Generated Feedback M SD M SD
Neutral 5.81 1.66 4.32 1.60
Negative 3.45 1.39 1.81 0.98
Study 4: Source of Positive Feedback
Self External
Self-Esteem M SD M SD
Low 3.81 1.17 5.01 1.03
High 5.33 0.86 5.51 0.65
NOTE: Perceived improvement scores can range from 1 to 9. Willing-
ness to accept feedback scores can range from 1 to 7.
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Regardless of which explanation is correct, this finding
provides an additional route through which low self-
esteem is maintained.
STUDY 4: SELF-REPORTED ACCEPTANCE
OF POSITIVE FEEDBACK
Taken together, the results from Studies 1 through 3
suggest that there are self-esteem differences in people’s
acceptance of self- versus externally generated positive
feedback. However, none of the studies presented here-
tofore offers direct evidence that people low in self-
esteem are hesitant to accept positive feedback from
themselves. Therefore, in Study 4, we used a self-report
methodology to assess participants’ willingness to accept
positive feedback from the self versus from an outsider.
Study 4 also was designed to deal with two additional
shortcoming of Studies 1 through 3. First, in the previous
studies, we confounded the explicitness of feedback with
the source of feedback; that is, the method by which
external feedback was given involved an explicit men-
tion of performance, whereas internal feedback was
merely implied by anagram performance. We addressed
this confound in Study 4 by asking participants about
their responses to explicit positive feedback only. Sec-
ond, in all previous studies, the feedback we administered
pertained only to people’s abilities in a competence-
relevant domain; therefore, in Study 4, we queried par-
ticipants about their acceptance of feedback in both
social and competence domains.
To do this, we presented participants with hypotheti-
cal scenarios in which they received positive self- or
externally generated feedback about their attractiveness
and likability, and we asked them to indicate the likeli-
hood that they would believe this feedback. We also
asked participants to indicate the extent to which they
generally trusted the self versus other people when
determining how good they were at a novel task. We pre-
dicted that participants low in self-esteem would rate self-
generated positive feedback as less believable than exter-
nally generated positive feedback but that this difference
would not emerge among participants high in self-
esteem.
Finally, we also used this self-report methodology to
explore questions pertaining to the ecological validity of
our proposed esteem-maintenance process. To this end,
we assessed participants’ subjective likelihood of experi-
encing the hypothetical scenarios and feedback that we
presented. We predicted that relative to participants
high in self-esteem, those low in self-esteem would esti-
mate a greater likelihood of receiving negative feedback
and a lower likelihood of receiving positive feedback.
These predictions derive from research suggesting that
people who rely primarily on positive feedback from oth-
ers to boost their self-esteem, such as those who are shy
(Asendorpf, 1987), depressed (Giesler, Josephs, &
Swann, 1996), or low in self-esteem (Josephs, Larrick,
Steele, & Nisbett, 1992), may structure their social envi-
ronments in such a way so as to avoid externally gener-
ated feedback because they fear it will be negative.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-four introductory psychology students (25
men and 49 women) participated in exchange for credit
toward a course requirement. To be eligible, students
had to score in the bottom or top 25% of the distribution
(Ms = 2.91 and 4.79 on a 5-point scale) on the Rosenberg
(1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), which was adminis-
tered during a pretesting session at the beginning of the
semester.7
PROCEDURE
An experimenter introduced participants to “an
investigation of the learning processes that occur in dif-
ferent situations” and asked them to complete a survey
consisting of several parts. First, written instructions
asked participants to imagine two hypothetical scenarios
in which they received positive feedback of an interper-
sonal nature. Each scenario appeared twice, with differ-
ent endings: In one ending, the participant received pos-
itive feedback from himself or herself, and in the second
ending the participant received similar feedback from
an external source. For example, the first scenario read
as follows: “You work up the courage to approach some-
one you have a crush on, but he/she rejects your request
for a date.” This scenario was followed once by a self-
generated feedback ending (“To make yourself feel
better, you look at your reflection in a mirror and tell
yourself ‘It’s okay, I know I’m attractive anyway’ ”) and
once by an externally generated feedback ending (“On
your way home, however, an attractive stranger flirts with
you and tells you that you’re ‘very good-looking’ ”). The
second scenario described a situation in which the par-
ticipant worked in a group with some classmates who
treated her badly; in the self-generated feedback ending,
the participant told herself that she was not at fault for
her groupmates’ behavior, and in the externally gener-
ated feedback ending the participant’s friends told her
that she was not at fault. Following each scenario ending,
participants rated the extent to which they would believe
the feedback on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7
(very much). Next, on these same 7-point scales, partici-
pants indicated the extent to which they generally
trusted “their own feelings” and “feedback from another
person” when deciding how competent they were at a
novel task. Approximately half of the participants
responded to all of the questions about externally gener-
ated feedback before responding to the questions about
928 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
self-generated feedback; the remaining participants
answered all of the self-generated feedback questions
first. Because order did not qualify any of our findings,
we do not discuss this variable further.
The remainder of the questions tapped into the likeli-
hood that participants would find themselves in situa-
tions such as those described in the scenarios and receive
feedback similar to that described in the scenarios. For
example, the questions that pertained to the first sce-
nario were as follows: “How likely is it that someone you
were attracted to would reject your request for a date?”
“How likely is it that you would reassure yourself that you
were attractive after being rejected?” and “How likely is
it that a stranger would tell you that you’re very good-
looking?” Participants answered all questions on scales
ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely). After
completing their surveys, participants were debriefed
and thanked.
Results
We created composite self and external feedback
acceptance scores by averaging across responses to the
questions about self-generated and externally generated
feedback, αs = .70 and .54, respectively. We then submit-
ted these feedback acceptance scores to a 2-between
(self-esteem: low vs. high) × 2-within (feedback source:
self vs. external) ANOVA (means and standard devia-
tions appear in Table 3). A significant main effect of
feedback source emerged, showing that participants
claimed to accept externally generated positive feed-
back more readily than self-generated positive feedback,
F(1, 72) = 27.04, p < .001, eta2 = .273. Moreover, a main
effect of self-esteem showed that people with low self-
esteem were less trusting of positive feedback than were
people with high self-esteem, F(1, 72) = 26.95, p < .001,
eta2 = .272. These main effects were qualified by a Self-
Esteem × Feedback-Source interaction, F(1, 72) = 15.16,
p < .001, eta2 = .174. Planned contrasts confirmed that
people with low self-esteem believed externally gener-
ated positive feedback more readily than they believed
positive feedback from themselves, F(1, 72) = 52.76, p <
.001, eta2 = .423, but people with high self-esteem
believed both externally and self-generated positive
feedback equally, F < 1.
We next conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs in
which we compared low and high self-esteem partici-
pants’ reports of the likelihood that they would encoun-
ter the situations and feedback described in the scenar-
ios. As expected, people with low self-esteem perceived a
greater likelihood of being rejected by someone to
whom they were attracted than did people with high self-
esteem, Ms = 4.00 and 3.28, respectively, F(1, 72) = 5.47, p
< .05, eta2 = .071. Despite their relatively high perceived
likelihood of rejection, however, people low (as com-
pared to high) in self-esteem indicated that they were
unlikely to reassure themselves they were attractive, Ms =
2.51 and 4.14, F(1, 72) = 17.08, p < .01, eta2 = .192. More-
over, people with low self-esteem believed that positive
feedback from a stranger was less likely for them than did
people with high self-esteem, Ms = 3.29 and 4.41, F(1, 72)
= 8.82, p < .01, eta2 = .109.
With regard to the second scenario, people low—rela-
tive to those high—in self-esteem believed it more likely
that a group of their classmates would mistreat them, Ms
= 2.64 and 2.14, F(1, 72) = 3.89, p = .052, eta2 = .051. In
this case, whereas people with low self-esteem were less
likely than their high self-esteem counterparts to reas-
sure themselves that they were not at fault, Ms = 4.24 and
5.48, F(1, 72) = 9.12, p < .01, eta2 = .112, both self-esteem
groups thought it equally likely that their friends would
tell them they were not at fault for their groupmates’
behavior, Ms = 6.07 and 6.41, F(1, 72) = 1.56, p = .22, eta2 =
.021.
Discussion
The results of Study 4 provide direct evidence that
people low in self-esteem are reluctant to accept positive
feedback from themselves in both social and compe-
tence domains. Whereas high self-esteem participants
reported being equally trusting of self-generated and
externally generated positive feedback, those with low
self-esteem rated self-generated positive feedback as less
believable than feedback that came from an external
source. Moreover, relative to those high in self-esteem,
people low in self-esteem predicted a higher likelihood
of experiencing rejection and a lower likelihood of
receiving positive feedback, regardless of its source (an
exception to this pattern was found for the group activity
scenario).
These results therefore suggest several important fac-
tors that may underlie self-esteem maintenance.
Whereas those high in self-esteem indicate a strong
belief in the legitimacy of positive feedback in the after-
math of rejection, those low in self-esteem may maintain
their level of self-esteem by (a) finding themselves in
esteem-threatening situations more often than their
high-esteem counterparts, (b) failing to offer themselves
positive feedback after experiencing threats to their self-
esteem, and (c) discounting the self-generated positive
feedback that they do offer themselves. It is arguable, of
course, that participants’ self-reports of the likelihood of
experiencing esteem-threatening situations derive more
from their theories about themselves than from their
actual experiences; these data therefore do not speak to
self-esteem differences in the frequency with which peo-
ple actually experience rejection or offer themselves pos-
itive feedback. Still, these self-reports are important
because they provide fairly straightforward evidence that
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low self-esteem persons at least perceive rejection in
their environments, even if this rejection is not real (e.g.,
Leary et al., 1995).
A final point merits attention here. Note that two of
the scenarios we used in Study 4 assessed people’s will-
ingness to accept positive feedback in a domain in which
they had just experienced interpersonal rejection. In
these (and other) situations, it may actually be more
rational and adaptive to believe positive feedback from
an outsider than from the self. That is, if one has received
the clear message that one’s company is not welcome, a
friend’s or stranger’s unsolicited reassurance might be a
more reliable measure of reality than one’s own positive
self-talk. We therefore do not suggest that it is always irra-
tional to reject self-generated positive feedback or that it
is always adaptive and healthy to accept positive feedback
regardless of its source. Indeed, it is entirely possible that
people with low self-esteem are wise to exercise caution
when it comes to believing their own feelings of success
and that people with high self-esteem are exhibiting
“positive illusions” when they indiscriminately accept
flattering feedback and evaluations (Taylor & Brown,
1988). Thus, our model concerns self-esteem differ-
ences in people’s chronic tendencies to accept versus
reject self-generated positive feedback and how these
might serve to maintain their self-esteem—not self-
esteem differences in people’s ability to distinguish accu-
rate from inaccurate feedback.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings reported here point to the critical role
that the source of feedback plays in determining its
impact on persons with low self-esteem. In Studies 1, 2,
and 4, we demonstrated that low and high self-esteem
people respond differently to positive feedback depend-
ing on whether such feedback comes from an internal or
external source. Specifically, high self-esteem people
appeared to accept positive feedback indiscriminately,
placing as much stock in subjective, self-generated feel-
ings of task mastery and self-directed reassurances as
they did in praise from an experimenter or other out-
sider. In contrast, those with low self-esteem accepted
positive feedback and reassurance more readily when it
came from an external source than when it came from
the self. Of importance, people’s willingness to accept
feedback may determine the impact of the feedback on
their self-esteem: As shown in Study 2, low self-esteem
people were not only reluctant to incorporate positive
self-generated feedback into their assessments of perfor-
mance at a novel task, but they were also reluctant to
incorporate such feedback into their assessments of self-
worth. That is, people with low self-esteem displayed
lower state self-esteem following positive self-generated
feedback than following positive experimenter-generated
feedback.
The results of Study 3 suggest that, unfortunately, low
self-esteem people do not have as much difficulty accept-
ing negative self-generated feedback as they have accept-
ing positive self-generated feedback (see also Swann,
1990). We propose that this troubling asymmetry may
shed light on the stubborn nature of low self-regard.
When people with low self-esteem are confronted with a
situation in which externally generated feedback is miss-
ing or neutral but self-generated feedback is positive,
they are reluctant to accept the self-generated feedback.
On the other hand, when external feedback is missing or
ambiguous but self-generated feedback is negative, per-
sons with low self-esteem are affected by it. Apparently,
self-generated feedback does not improve the self-views
of people with low self-esteem but it may serve to main-
tain or perhaps even depress their negative self-views. As
discussed below, this finding both confirms and adds to
previous findings regarding self-esteem maintenance.
Self-Esteem Maintenance
As noted earlier, self-esteem tends to remain stable
across time (Baumeister, 1993). Although a comprehen-
sive model of low self-esteem maintenance has yet to be
offered, theorists have discussed some of the processes
responsible for the stubborn persistence of negative self-
regard. For example, Festinger (1954) proposed that
people with low self-esteem put more emphasis on social
comparison information than do people with high self-
esteem, suggesting that the former may be at the mercy
of external appraisals and perhaps rely excessively on
external sources of information to draw conclusions
about the self (see also Leary & Downs, 1995). The pat-
tern of findings presented in this article, although not
providing a direct test of these ideas, is at least consistent
with Festinger’s theorizing: Our high self-esteem partici-
pants accepted feedback from the self as well as from an
external source, whereas our low self-esteem partici-
pants based their self-assessments primarily on exter-
nally generated feedback (except when self-generated
feedback was negative).
At first glance, a possible alternate route to high self-
esteem seems obvious: If low self-esteem people could
elicit frequent, positive feedback from the environment,
this might compensate for their reluctance to capitalize
on positive self-generated feedback. In the short run,
externally generated positive feedback may temporarily
boost the self-esteem of people who doubt their own
credibility; ultimately, such feedback might even result
in permanent self-esteem increases. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the solution may not be that simple. As Swann’s
(1990) work on self-verification suggests, people with
low self-esteem often prefer to receive negative over posi-
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tive feedback from others. In fact, low self-esteem people
may actively work to ensure that their social environ-
ments provide them with feedback that confirms their
negative self-views. Moreover, even when low self-esteem
persons receive positive, verbal feedback from real-
world external sources, this feedback is often paired with
negative, nonverbal feedback that renders it ambiguous
(Swann et al., 1992). Thus, the feedback that may be
most effective in helping people with low self-esteem to
overcome their feelings of inferiority—positive, exter-
nally generated feedback—may be relatively rare. Our
finding that low self-esteem people believed it relatively
unlikely that they would receive positive feedback from
an outside source supports this “rarity of feedback”
hypothesis.
Directions for Further Study
The mental health field embraces a number of differ-
ent professions, methodologies, and theoretical orienta-
tions. Despite the breadth of the field, some broad dis-
tinctions are possible. For example, most therapies can
be categorized based on the source of feedback on which
they rely. Groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and
Weight Watchers incorporate considerable amounts of
externally generated feedback into their programs; the
members of these groups are partially responsible for
providing support and praise for one another. Other
sources of help, which include self-help books such as
Harris’s (1969) well-known I’m OK, You’re OK, instead
concentrate on the development and use of self-generated
feedback. Specifically, these self-help sources assume
that “self-affirmations”—positive self-statements that can
be considered analogous to self-generated feedback—
are an effective technique for raising self-esteem.
Whereas support groups and other types of therapies
that include elements of externally generated feedback
may be extremely helpful for those with varying levels of
self-esteem, our findings suggest that interventions that
rely exclusively on self-generated feedback may be less
likely to succeed among those with low self-esteem. At
least in some contexts, people with low self-esteem
appear unable to accept positive feedback that stems
from the self. Granted, we looked at people’s temporary
feelings of state self-esteem here and did not examine
the possible long-term consequences of positive, self-
generated feedback. Nonetheless, we propose that for
permanent increases in self-esteem to occur, minor,
incremental changes must take root, and our data sug-
gest that such changes may not take root in self-concepts
fraught with insecurity and doubt. Thus, some popular
self-help techniques may be based on the faulty assump-
tion that those who need help are capable of generating
and accepting the cognitions required to help them-
selves. Although a considerable gap exists between our
current research and these speculations, we believe that
the application of our findings to the field of self-help
research is theoretically promising, and we hope to dem-
onstrate this empirically in the future.
A second direction for future research involves pin-
pointing the precise reason why people with low self-
esteem have difficulty accepting their own self-directed
positive feedback. In this article, we entertained three
different possibilities—impression management con-
cerns, chronic overattentiveness to rejection cues, and
difficulty perceiving the self as credible—but our data do
not allow us to draw conclusions regarding which, if any,
of these perspectives provides the best explanation for
our findings. Moreover, note that these perspectives,
and the explanations they offer, are not mutually exclu-
sive; it is certainly possible that some combination of
these (and/or additional) self-esteem-related processes
work in tandem to ensure that low self-esteem people
will hesitate to embrace their own feelings of success.
Thus, although a thorough explanation for the underly-
ing mechanism is beyond the scope of this article, we
believe that the pursuit of this question will yield greater
insight into the “puzzle of low self-regard.”
Finally, because we relied on a nonclinical sample to
test our hypotheses, it is possible that the self-esteem of
our “low self-esteem” participants was only moderately—
rather than truly—low. After all, most undergraduates
report having high self-esteem (e.g., Taylor & Brown,
1988), and even people who appear to have low self-
esteem in a relative sense, that is, people who score in the
bottom 25th percentile on a self-esteem scale, do not
necessarily have low self-esteem in an absolute sense
(Baumeister et al., 1989). It would therefore be illumi-
nating to replicate these findings in a sample of people
who strongly dislike themselves, such as individuals who
are undergoing treatment for clinical depression. We
suspect that our effects would be even stronger among
people who possess predominantly negative self-views,
but this hunch awaits empirical investigation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the years since Festinger’s (1954) theorizing, many
researchers have empirically documented differences in
the ways people with high and low self-esteem react to
similar feedback. Although the methodologies and
results of these studies are diverse, there is a general ten-
dency for people with low self-esteem to be more
strongly affected by feedback than are those with high
self-esteem (e.g., Brockner, 1988; Shrauger & Sorman,
1977). Consistent with several theories of low self-
esteem, our findings demonstrate an important excep-
tion to this general tendency, an exception that poten-
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tially provides insight into the puzzle of low self-regard:
People with low self-esteem are apparently resistant to
feedback when the feedback is positive and the source is
the self. Unfortunately, the low self-esteem person’s
reluctance to accept positive self-generated feedback,
combined with the rarity of externally generated positive
feedback (e.g., Josephs et al., 1992; Swann et al., 1992),
may result in a downward spiral from which recovery is
difficult.
NOTES
1. To confirm that there were no meaningful self-esteem differ-
ences in perceived change across the anagrams, we estimated the num-
ber of participants we would need per condition to obtain significant
self-esteem interaction effects. Given that eta2 < .03 for each interac-
tion involving self-esteem (and setting power at .60), we would have
needed an N of more than 250 people per condition to find significant
interactions of self-esteem with any other variable (see Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991).
2. Degrees of freedom for this analysis differ from those in the pre-
vious ANOVA because two participants failed to rate the experi-
menter’s feedback.
3. We estimated the number of participants we would need per con-
dition to obtain significant self-esteem interaction effects. For the Self-
Esteem × Perceptions-of-Feedback interaction, eta2 = .059; for the
three-way interaction, eta2 = .063. Thus, setting power at .60, we would
have needed an N of approximately 200 people per condition to find
significant interactions with self-esteem (see Rosenthal & Rosnow,
1991). Even relaxing power to a level (.40) that would result in a
greater than 50% chance of a Type II error, we would need approxi-
mately 130 people per condition to achieve statistically significant
interactions with self-esteem.
4. We programmed the computer to reveal the first letter of the
solution on the screen if 5 min passed without the participant entering
the correct solution. Three participants required this clue and all of
them solved the anagram correctly within a minute of receiving it.
5. We do not consider it problematic that the three-way interaction
did not reach significance. An increasing number of researchers are
arguing that multiway (three-way and greater) ANOVAs are difficult to
interpret correctly and are not appropriate tests of the great majority of
hypotheses (e.g., Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997; Rosnow &
Rosenthal, 1995).
6. Degrees of freedom differ for this analysis because two partici-
pants did not complete the entire State Self-Esteem Scale.
7. We switched to the Rosenberg here because, due to an oversight,
the Self-Liking and Self-Competence Scale (SLCS) was not pretested.
The Rosenberg is correlated at approximately .70 with the SLCS.
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